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This paper investigates whether foreign subsidiaries outperform their parent banks in terms of 
profitability and what determines this outcome. Using a large sample of multinational banks 
and their subsidiaries in a large number of countries, this study shows that,  on average, 
foreign subsidiaries are less profitable than their parent banks are. At the same time, however, 
foreign subsidiaries have higher net interest margins but also higher overhead costs relative to 
their parent banks. One explanation for the results is that parent banks transfer income banks 
using overhead costs, what may explain the existing results. Moreover, the results show that 
foreign subsidiaries tend to perform better than their parent banks if the latter are 
underperforming in the home market. Finally, the results show that the determinants of the 
profitability of the subsidiary in relation to its parent bank are strongly determined by the 
origins of the parent bank and, to a lesser extent, by the host market’s characteristics as well 
as the distance to the home country of the multinational bank.  
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When are multinational banks getting a bang for their buck 
 on their subsidiaries abroad? 
 
1.  Introduction 
It is generally assumed that multinational banks expand abroad with the aim of 
increasing their overall profitability. Hence, many studies have compared the 
performance of foreign banks to domestic banks in host markets and have found 
contradictory results. In developing countries, most empirical studies have shown that 
foreign banks tend to outperform domestic banks in terms of profitability and efficiency. 
On the contrary, in developed countries, studies show that foreign subsidiaries tend to 
perform poorly when compared to their domestic counterparts (Classens and van Horen, 
2009). None of the existing studies, however, have presented how the foreign subsidiaries 
perform in relation to their parent banks, which may be important in understanding why 
banks expand abroad even though they may underperform in the host markets in 
comparison to domestic banks. 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2001) argues that efficient, profit-maximizing banks are more 
likely to expand abroad to seek higher profits. To do so, those banks must devote capital 
to their foreign subsidiaries. Hence, it may be expected that the funds will only be 
devoted to the host nation if the parent bank expects these to earn a higher rate of return 
than in the home market. As the authors suggest, since only the most profitable and 
efficient multinational banks are expanding abroad, it may be expected that the foreign-
owned subsidiaries should significantly outperform their parent banks abroad. 
Nevertheless, to date, the relationship between the parent bank and its subsidiaries 
abroad has received little attention in the literature. Therefore, little is known on whether 
foreign subsidiaries are outperforming their parent banks in terms of profitability and, if 
so, what determines the result. This study tries to fill the existing gap by considering the 
performance and factors that determine the profitability of the subsidiaries abroad relative 
to their parent banks. Specifically, this study examines the differences in the performance 
between the foreign-owned subsidiaries and their parent banks, measured in terms of 
profitability and overhead costs, in a large group of countries over the period between 
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1989 and 2008. In the regression framework, the effects of bank-specific, ownership-
specific and macro-determinants on profitability are analyzed, and the large number of 
countries in the panel enables to exploit the variation in host and home country 
characteristics. 
The results of this study reveal that, on average, foreign bank subsidiaries are less 
profitable than their parent banks. Indeed, the results show that what determines the 
subsidiaries’ profitability is the inefficiency of the parent bank in the home market. This 
means that foreign subsidiaries are outperforming their parent banks only if the latter is 
underperforming in the home market. The results, however, also show that, in countries 
with high corporate taxes, the overhead costs of the subsidiaries are significantly higher, 
which may explain overall underperformance in relation to the parent bank. 
Consequently, this result may also suggest that the parent bank may transfer profits from 
high to low tax areas, which could explain the underperformance of foreign subsidiaries. 
These findings are supported by the fact that, on average, foreign-owned subsidiaries 
perform significantly better in terms of net interest income than their parent banks; in the 
case of noninterest income, the differences are not statistically significant. Moreover, the 
results also reveal that the macroeconomic factors of the host country as well as the 
geographical and cultural distance between the host and home countries are less 
important in explaining the relative performance of foreign banks to parent banks. On the 
other hand, some of those factors were found to be important in understanding the 
performance of the foreign-owned subsidiaries, yet they were determined by the region 
where the entity operates and the country of origin of the parent bank. 
The results of this study add to the literature in several ways. Most important, it 
extends the literature on the performance of foreign banks by showing the results in 
relation to the parent bank, which has been ignored in the past. Second, it expands the 
limited literature on the ownership factors that affect a foreign bank’s ability to operate in 
a host country, as expressed in Williams (2003) and Sturm and William (2010). In this 
study, I explicitly analyze the impacts of some specific parent bank characteristics, and 
the results reflect evidence from a large number of countries. As such, it provides an 
explanation for some of the contradicting results found in the literature in the past. Third, 
by studying the impact of macroeconomic factors and the distance between home and Introduction
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host markets, the study contributes to the rapidly increasing literature on their impact on 
the performance of foreign banks. Finally, most studies focus only on developed or 
developing countries or both groups at the same time. In this study, the sample is divided 
not only according to the operation of the foreign-owned subsidiary but also according to 
the region of origin of the parent bank. 
I organize the rest of the paper as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical 
predictions regarding the factors that may affect foreign bank performance. Section 3 
describes the variable selection used in this study. Section 4 introduces the data and 
presents univariate statistics. Section 5 presents the estimation method and the empirical 
results, while Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2.  Literature review 
In the literature on multinational banking, the determinants of banks’ profitability are 
usually dichotomized into internal and external factors. The internal factors focus on 
bank-specific features,  while external factors consider the location-specific factors. I 
discuss them all briefly in what follows. 
The research on internal-specific factors emphasizes the importance of banks’ assets 
and liabilities structures on their performance. It argues that foreign banks differ in the 
funding and asset mix from domestic banks, which can be an explanation for its 
underperformance in some of the foreign markets. DeYoung and Nolle (1996), for 
example, argue that, in the US, foreign banks are less profit efficient as a consequence of 
their reliance on purchased funds. In Europe, Molyneux et al. (1998) present evidence 
that the profitability of foreign banks is related to their capital ratios, commercial and 
industrial loan growth, and asset portfolio composition. Individual country studies 
confirm that more profitable banks have, on average, lower costs of funds, greater use of 
transaction deposits, more marketable securities and higher capitalization (Wall, 1985). 
The ownership specifics are related to the parent bank’s characteristics, which may 
affect the performance of their subsidiaries abroad. Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992) 
documented that the most important variables determining the timing of foreign bank 
entry into a host market are the size and the existing level of geographical diversification 
of the parent bank. Later, Berger et al. (2000) suggested that there is some evidence Literature review
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showing that banks that perform well at home also perform well abroad. Minh To and 
Tripe (2002) argued that a more profitable bank could result in increased profitability in 
foreign markets. The positive impact of the parent bank’s profitability on foreign 
subsidiaries was confirmed by Kosmidou et al. (2007). On the contrary, Williams (2003) 
did not find parent bank profits to affect foreign subsidiaries in Australia. Hence, the 
studies on the effects of the parent bank on their subsidiaries in the host markets are not 
only scarce but also inconsistent. 
The impact of macroeconomic variables and host country financial structures on bank 
performance has been highlighted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huzinga (1999), who reported 
that macroeconomic and regulatory conditions have a pronounced impact on profitability 
and margins. In particular, they found that foreign banks have higher margins and profits 
as compared to domestic banks in developing countries, while the opposite holds in 
developed countries. Furthermore, the authors documented that lower market 
concentration ratios lead to lower margins and profits, while the effect of foreign 
ownership varies between industrialized and developing countries. 
Recently, the distance between host and home market has also been considered as an 
additional location-specific advantage. The reason for this is that the cost of monitoring 
investment grows with distance. Consequently, since the cost of monitoring clients is 
higher in distant markets, it should constitute a barrier to entry and as a result makes 
banks less willing to invest in countries far away from the home market. Moreover, 
Berger et al. (2001) suggested that efficiency barriers, such as geographical distance, 
different languages and cultures, or regulations, impede cross-border activity and 
therefore offset some of the gains of cross-border consolidation. Those assumptions were 
confirmed by Correa (2008), who showed that, in industrialized countries, the 
postacquisition performance of cross-border banks is higher when host and home country 
share the same language but is lower when they share the same legal system.  
Overall, the existing literature provides a rather comprehensive account of the effect 
of internal and location-specific determinants on bank profitability, but the effects of 
ownership (parent) are not very well known. Therefore, the focus of this study is to unify 
all of these factors into a single model in order to provide new insight on the factors that 
affect foreign subsidiaries’ profitability relative to their parent banks. Literature review
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3.  Determinants and variable selection 
The aim of the study is to establish the determinants of profitability  of foreign 
subsidiaries relative to the performance of the parent bank. I do this using a dependent 
variable, which is the difference between the profitability of the foreign-owned subsidiary 
and its parent. As the profitability measure, I consider the bank’s return on assets (ROA), 
which is calculated using the profit before taxes, and therefore eliminates any possible 
influence of the different tax systems in the results of the analyses. Moreover, ROA is not 
distorted by high equity multipliers, and hence represents a better measure of bank 
performance than the alternative proxy, which is the return on equity (Rivard and 
Thomas, 1997). On the other hand, ROA may be biased due to off-balance-sheet 
activities, yet I believe such activities are negligible in banks’ subsidiaries abroad. 
Nevertheless, two additional dependent variables are used in the study to measure the 
efficiency of the foreign subsidiaries. The difference in net interest margin between the 
foreign subsidiary and its parent bank (NIM) is employed as an alternative measure of 
profitability. The difference in overhead costs of the foreign subsidiary and the parent 
banks (Costs) is used to measure cost efficiency, whereas the ratio was calculated by 
dividing it by the total assets. Both variables have a significant impact on the profitability 
of the subsidiary abroad and may also be influenced by the ownership effects. 
As for the potential determinants of bank performance, the literature suggests that 
such determinants are internal bank-specific factors, ownership-specific factors and 
location-specific factors. Considering those factors in turn, the chosen set of independent 
variables is discussed. A description of all of the variables provides Table 1. 
3.1.  Internal bank factors 
First, I control for bank-specific characteristics to see whether they determine the 
performance of the foreign subsidiary using Equity, Deposits, Loans and Securities to 
total assets as well as the log of the total Assets. Based on the existing literature, all of the 
variables should positively influence subsidiaries’ performance abroad.  
Berger (1995) has shown that well-capitalized banks provide a signal to the market 
and document positive causation in both direction between capital and profitability. 
DeYoung and Nolle’s (1996) results implied that foreign banks had a distinct 
7 
 
disadvantage primarily driven by excess expenditures on purchased funds as they lacked 
the ability to build their base of core deposits in the host country. Similar findings were 
presented by Peek et al. (1999), who reported that banks acquired by foreigners depend 
less on core deposits and more on purchased funds than domestic banks do. In addition, 
both studies documented that foreign banks were conducting an aggressive loan policy, 
which, combined with their funding structures, may be a reason why they were 
underperforming in comparison to their domestic peers. On the other hand, studies using 
developing countries as a sample show that foreign banks are profitable despite their 
average stronger loan growth and lesser reliance on deposits than domestic banks (Crystal 
et al., 2001).  
Crystal et al. (2001) shows that foreign banks are holding higher levels of liquid of 
assets, which they associate with greater reliance on potentially more volatile nondeposit 
borrowing. Moreover, high levels of liquid assets are usually associated with lower 
profitability. A negative and significant relationship between the level of liquidity and 
banks’ profitability was documented by Molyneux and Thorton (1992), but in contrast, 
Bourke (1989) has shown opposite results.  
As for liquidity, the results obtained in the literature for the relationship between size 
and profits are diverse. Smirlock (1985) documented a positive and significant 
relationship between size and bank profitability. By contrast, Berger et al. (1987) find 
that as product mixes and scales increase, banks experience some diseconomies, implying 
a negative relationship between size and returns.  
3.2.  Ownership-specific factors 
Second, I control for parent-specific factors using the same set of bank level variables 
as for the foreign-owned subsidiary. In contrast to the internal factors, the existing studies 
present limited evidence on the parents’ effects on subsidiaries’ performance. I use parent 
banks Equity, Deposits and Assets ratio proxies for subsidiaries’ access to cheap funds 
and expect this to be positively related to their profitably. By contrast, I expect Loans and 
Securities to be negatively related to subsidiaries’ performance as they may signal the 
higher profitability of the home market banking operation than of the host market.  Determinants and variable selection
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As for evidence, Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992) found parent size to be important in 
determining the size of subsidiaries in the host nation, whereas Williams and Sturm 
(2010) found it to be insignificant. Recently, de Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) provided 
evidence for the existence of internal capital markets through which multinational banks 
manage the credit growth of their foreign subsidiaries. They show that foreign 
subsidiaries expand lending faster when economic growth in the parent bank’s home 
country decreases, yet the results for the substitution effects were weak.  
In addition to the bank-level variables, three different variables are used to control for 
parent efficiency in the home market, which may provide a source of competitive 
advantage in the host markets (Minh To and Tipe, 2002). The difference in the return on 
assets (dROA) or net interest margin (dNIM) of the parent bank and the industry in the 
home market is used to control for parent’s profitability efficiency when either ROA or 
NIM is employed as a dependent variable. It is expected that those two variables are 
positively related to foreign subsidiaries’ performance, yet the existing results are again 
mixed. Williams and Sturm (2010) did not find that parent profitability has any effect on 
foreign bank performance in Australia; by contrast, Kosmidou et al. (2007) found it to be 
significant for foreign subsidiaries of Greek multinational banks. 
Following Williams’ and Sturm (2010) argumentation, it is possible that foreign bank 
parent efficiency, as measured by profitability, does not increase foreign bank profits in 
the host market but does increase foreign bank efficiency. To control for this effect, a 
variable is used that reflects the difference between the overhead costs of the parent bank 
and the industry in the home market (dCost). This variable is used when Cost  is 
employed as the dependent variable in the regression, whereas a negative relationship is 
expected. In other words, it is expected that cost-efficient parent banks will more likely 
have even more cost efficient subsidiaries abroad, and vice versa.  
 
3.3.   Macroeconomic and industry-specific factors 
Third, the impact of macroeconomic and industry-specific factors on bank 
performance has recently been highlighted in the literature. The variable log of 
population (Population) and the level of GDP per capita capture the potential for scale Determinants and variable selection
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economies in the host country (Buch and DeLong, 2004). Economic Growth is used as a 
proxy for the attractiveness of the local market. Moreover, the marginal corporate tax rate 
(Tax) is added to control for possible intra-group transfer pricing, which may influence 
the probability. Hence, it is expected that corporate tax is negatively related to 
subsidiaries’ profitability, whereas the first three proxies are not. 
Next, three measures are incorporated to represent the host country’s financial 
industry characteristics and development. The level of liquid liabilities to GDP (M3) 
measures the financial system development, while a dummy, Crisis, controls for financial 
crises in the host country. De Haas and van Lelyveld (2010) have shown that foreign 
banks are not negatively affected by systemic banking crises in the host countries, as they 
have a different structure of assets and liabilities than domestic banks do. Moreover, the 
share of the five largest banks in total assets of the banking sector is used to measure 
concentration (CR5), as Berger (1995) provided evidence that superior management and 
increased market share raise profits. Hence, all three variables are expected to be 
positively related to subsidiaries’ profits. 
3.4.  Distance factors 
Classens and van Horen (2009) documented that the relative performance of 
foreign banks is better when the geographical, cultural and institutional distance is small. 
In contrast, they showed that foreign banks perform better when the economic distance is 
large, whereas the parent’s home country has a higher level of development than the host 
country. To control for the effects of distance, the following four explanatory variables 
are included. 
Geographical and cultural aspects are represented using Sregion, which equals 
one if host and home countries are located in the same region as defined by the World 
Bank, while Slanguage is one if the official language in both countries is the same. Those 
two variables represent the information costs (Buch and DeLong, 2004), but the 
institutional aspects may also be important (Mian, 2006). Therefore, a dummy, Slaw, is 
used, which equals one if the countries have the same legal origins, to control for the 
differences in the institutional environment in the host countries. Finally, Classens and 
van Horen (2009) note that bank origin matters for banking efficiency and profitability Determinants and variable selection
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and show that foreign banks outperform domestic banks when they come from more 
developed countries. On the other hand, Sturm and Williams (2010) reported 
contradicting evidence, so this issue needs to be clarified. The economic distance proxy 
dummy, Deconomy, equals one if the home market has the same or a higher level of 
economic development than the host market and equals zero otherwise, whereas the 
division between the countries is made using the World Bank’s classification in 2009.  
 
Table 1  
Variables definition 
Variables  Description 
Dependent 
ROA  The difference in return on assets of the foreign subsidiary and parent bank, 
where ROA is calculated as pretax income divided by total assets 
NIM 
The difference in net interest margin between the foreign subsidiary and its 
parent bank, where NIM is calculated as net interest income divided by 
total assets 
Cost 
The difference in overhead costs between the foreign subsidiary and its 
parent bank, where cost is calculated as overhead costs divided by total 
assets 
Foreign bank level intern and ownership specific factors 
Loanss,p  Total loans divided by total assets of the foreign subsidiary s or its parent 
bank p 
Depositss,p  Total deposits divided by total assets of the foreign subsidiary s or its 
parent bank p 
Securitiess,p  Total securities divided by total assets of the foreign subsidiary s or its 
parent bank p 
Assetss,p  Natural logarithm of the total assets of the foreign subsidiary s or parent 
bank p 
dROA  The difference in return on assets of the parent bank and the average value 
for all banks in the home country 
dNIM  The difference in net interest margin between the parent bank and the 
average value for all banks in the home country 
dCost  The difference in overhead costs between the parent bank and the average 
value for all banks in the home country 
Location (host country) and distance specific factors 
Population  Logarithm of population  
GDP  Logarithm of GDP per capita  
Growth  Annual growth rate of GDP 
Tax  Highest marginal corporate tax rate  
M3  Liquid liabilities to GDP Determinants and variable selection




CR5  The concentration ratio calculated by dividing the assets of the five largest 
banks with the total assets of all banks 
Crisis  Dummy which is 1 if a bank crisis is present in the host country, 0 
otherwise 
Sregion  Dummy which is 1 if home and host country share the same region, 0 
otherwise 
Slanguage  Dummy variable set equal to 1 if official language of both host and home 
country is the same, 0 otherwise 
Slaw 
Dummy variable set equal to 1 if the same legal system prevails in the 
home and host country, 0 otherwise. Legal systems considered are (by 
origin): English, Russian, French, German, and Scandinavian 
Deconomy  Dummy variable set equal to 1 if host country has the same or higher level 
of economic development than the home country, 0 otherwise 
The data for calculating the bank specific variables were obtained from BankScope database. The data for 
country-specific variables were obtained from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), CIA Factbook (2010), 
Laeven and Valencia (2010) and World Bank Development Indicators. 
4.  Data and univariate statistics 
To select the multinational banks that constitute the sample of the study, a list of the 
world’s 150 largest banks (asset rank) was prepared using the 2008 ranking of banks 
published by the magazine The Banker. From this list, multinational banks were selected 
for further examination if they owned at least 50 % in one bank abroad, and the financial 
statement for the bank and its foreign subsidiary was available in the BankScope 
database. Moreover, for the parent bank, unconsolidated financial data were retrieved, 
whereas for the foreign subsidiaries, consolidated financial statements  were  used  in 
further computation. In the construction of the dataset the author followed Haas and 
Lelyveld (2010), who analyzed interbank capital markets inside multinational banks. 
Using this approach, a final sample was constructed that included 62 multinational 
banks, mainly from the US, Western Europe and East Asia, and 288 subsidiaries in 
developed and developing countries. Additional country-specific and market-specific 
data were drawn mainly from the WDI database as well as from the World Bank’s 
Financial Structure Database (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2010). A sample of 1,533 
observations on each variable made up an unbalanced panel covering the period between 
1989 and 2008, whereas in some of the regressions, the number is reduced because all of 
the variables were not always available for the multinational banks in the sample. 
4.1.  Univariate results 
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Table 2 displays panel means and standard deviations for the multinational banks and 
foreign subsidiaries. The last column in the table presents the results of t-statistic tests for 
the difference in the means between the parent bank and its subsidiary, whereas the 
results confirm that both groups differ significantly in terms of profitability, costs, assets 
and liabilities structures. 
The ROA for the parent banks is almost four times higher than that of their foreign 
subsidiaries, and therefore they seem at first to be more profitable. Kosmidou et al. 
(2007) reported similar results, in which he also documented that the median ROA for 
Greek bank subsidiaries was lower than its parent bank. At the same time, however, 
parent banks have significantly lower NIM than their subsidiaries. As net interest income 
constitutes the largest part of the banks’ income, the underperformance of subsidiaries in 
comparison to the parent bank can be seen as unusual. In particular, the level of 
noninterest income does not differ significantly between the parent bank and its 
subsidiaries. In addition, foreign subsidiaries have lower loan loss reserves than their 
parent banks. As a result, higher overhead costs seem to be the only explanation, which 
explains the observed lower profitability of the subsidiary relative to the parent banks. 
The results may thus indicate that either operating abroad is very costly or multinational 
banks use overhead expenses to transfer some of the income to the home markets, which 
could also explain the reported underperformance of foreign subsidiaries in comparison 
to domestic banks in some of the existing studies. 
The foreign subsidiaries also differ significantly from their parent banks in terms of 
their assets and liability structures. The volume of total assets and capital ratios of the 
parent bank is significantly higher than it is in the subsidiaries, which could be attributed 
to the different models of operation in host markets. It may also explain why parent banks 
produced slightly fewer loans as a percentage of total assets than did their foreign 
subsidiaries. Surprisingly, however, foreign subsidiaries have significantly higher 
deposits as a percentage of assets than parent banks do. Indeed, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huzinga (1999) reported that those foreign banks that had higher levels of deposits also 
had higher levels of overhead costs, which they attributed to high branching expenses. 
Hence, the high level of deposits may be another explanation for the high overhead costs 
of the foreign subsidiaries in comparison to the parent banks. Moreover, the high level of   Data and univariate statistics
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deposits may also explain the reason for the higher level of securities held by subsidiaries 
relative to parent banks, which additionally may have a negative impact on profitability. 
Those results contradict, however, those of Peek et al. (1999), who documented that, in 
the US, foreign banks have problems attracting  deposits and, as a result, were 
underperforming in comparison to domestic banks. 
Overall, the results confirm that parent banks differ to a large extent from their 
foreign subsidiaries in terms of profitability, costs and balance sheet structures. As a 
result, the question of what determines the profitability of foreign subsidiaries relative to 




Summary statistics and univariate comparison 
Variables    Parent  Subsidiary  Differences 
N  mean  st dev  mean  st dev  mean  st dev 
Pretax income  3585  0.045  0.125  0.016  0.055  0.029
***  0.135 
Net interest income  3118  0.024  0.049  0.029  0.038  -0.004
***  0.061 
Non-interest income  3192  0.017  0.074  0.022  0.276  -0.005  0.281 
Overhead costs  3133  0.021  0.030  0.050  0.220  -0.029
***  0.222 
Loan loss provisions  2670  0.087  0.332  0.007  0.030  0.080
***  0.336 
Tax  2819  0.002  0.008  0.005  0.010  -0.002
***  0.013 
Equity  4154  0.230  0.314  0.126  0.128  0.104
***  0.344 
Loans  3071  0.413  0.190  0.428  0.239  -0.016
***  0.305 
Deposits  3067  0.586  0.217  0.712  0.216  -0.126
***  0.321 
Securities  2911  0.180  0.098  0.192  0.189  -0.013
***  0.211 
Assets  4007  11.500  1.777  7.009  1.897  4.491
***  2.466 
Note: All variables presented as a percentage of total assets with the exception of the variable assets, which 
was calculated as log of total assets. 
***,
**,
*indicate significant difference between means for the parent 
bank and its subsidiaries at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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Summary statistics and univariate comparison 
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***,
**,
*indicate significant difference between means for the parent 
bank and its subsidiaries at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test. 
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(2001) argues that since basic econometric methods can use robust inference techniques, 
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subsidiaries’ profitability and their parent bank’s cost efficiency, whereas they are 
estimated using fixed and random effects regressions, respectively. 
Among the foreign bank internal factors, the results show that well-capitalized 
subsidiaries with a low level of deposits have higher net interest margins than the parent 
banks, yet the results also document that this does not translate into higher profitability. 
One explanation for the results could be high overhead costs, which could be related to 
the transaction costs of financing the foreign operations. Also, the size of the subsidiary 
seems to have an effect on costs but not on profitability. The results show that smaller 
banks have lower overhead costs, yet the coefficient is negative and significant only in 
the fixed effects regression. 
The ownership-specific variables dROA and dNIM presenting the performance of the 
parent bank in the home markets are significant, yet they are negatively related to the 
subsidiaries’ profitability. This means that foreign subsidiaries are outperforming the 
parent bank when the latter is underperforming relative to its peers in the home market. 
Consequently, it seems that the ownership factor is not an advantage in the first place and 
does not have an impact on subsidiaries’ performance abroad. On the other hand, the 
results also suggest that going abroad may improve the results of multinational banks, 
which underperform in the home market. It could also explain why banks decide to 
expand abroad even as their subsidiaries underperform as compared to domestic banks.  
Although the overall performance has a negative effect on the subsidiary, the cost 
efficiency does not. The variable dCosts remains insignificant in all of the regressions 
even as ROA is used instead of Costs as the dependent variable. Consequently, the results 
show that the cost efficiency of the parent bank in the home market does not have a 
significant impact on the profitability of its subsidiary abroad. 
Indeed, the results also reveal that the effects of parent bank assets or its structures on 
its foreign subsidiaries’ profitability are weak. The lack of size effects on subsidiaries is 
consistent with the previous results of Williams (1998) and Kosmidou (2007). On the 
other hand, the effects of size seem to be consistent, and the coefficient Assetsp is always 
positive yet is only significant once. By contrast, the results show that well-capitalized 
parent banks have less profitable foreign subsidiaries. An explanation for the results Methodology and empirical results
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could be that the low profitability of the subsidiaries may hinder multinational banks to 
invest further funds abroad, which could explain their high capitalization. 
The location-specific variables are important only to some extent. The results show 
that declining economic growth as well as a financial crisis in the host countries 
positively affects the net interest margins of the subsidiary. Hence, the results confirm 
that subsidiaries are less prone to hosts’ economic cycles. One explanation for the results 
is that subsidiaries have a different structure for loans than domestic banks do, which 
allows them to keep their profitability high during economic downturns (Clarke et al., 
2001). Indeed, it may be assumed that subsidiaries, due to the support of the parent bank, 
may use the economic uncertainty in the host country to increase their market share as 
well as their interest margins.  
An interesting relationship is presented with the variable Tax, which is positive and 
statistically significant when costs are used as the dependent variable. It means that 
subsidiaries have higher overhead costs in host countries with higher corporate taxes. 
Consequently, this finding may signal transfer pricing from foreign subsidiaries and may 
explain to some extent the low profitability observed in many studies. 
Finally, none of the models supports the effects of the  similarities and distance 
between the host and home markets on foreign bank performance. Apparently, those 
variables are important only under some conditions, which will be explored by dividing 
the multinational banks and subsidiaries into subsamples. 
 
Table 3 
Foreign subsidiaries performance relative to its parent bank  
Dependent 
variable 
Fixed-effects regression  Random-effects regression 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ROA  NIM  Costs  ROA  ROA  NIM  Cost  ROA 
Equitys  0.05  0.08
***  0.27
**  0.05  0.07  0.06
***  0.24
**  0.07 
  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.10)  (0.06) 
Loanss  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Depositss  0.01  -0.02
**  0.03  0.00  0.00  -0.02
*  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Securitiess  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Assetss  0.00  -0.00  -0.01
**  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
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  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Equityp  -0.06  0.00  -0.04  -0.11




  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
Loansp  -0.01  0.00  -0.04  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.03
*  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Depositsp  0.01  -0.01  -0.04  -0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Securitiesp  -0.05  0.01  -0.01  -0.05  -0.03  -0.02  0.05  -0.01 
  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
Assetsp  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00
**  0.00  0.00
* 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
dROAp  -0.73
***        -0.58
***       
  (0.12)        (0.10)       
dNIMp    -0.53
***        -0.39
***     
    (0.05)        (0.05)     
dCostsp      -0.15  0.12      -0.01  0.19
* 
      (0.10)  (0.08)      (0.09)  (0.11) 
Population  -0.28  -0.09  -0.25  -0.26  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.26)  (0.06)  (0.16)  (0.26)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDP  0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.01  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  -0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00) 
Growth  -0.01  -0.08
***  -0.04  0.02  0.03  -0.08
***  -0.02  0.06 
  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06) 
Tax  0.04  -0.00  0.12
**  0.05  -0.06
*  0.01  0.04
**  -0.07
** 
  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
M3  0.01  0.01  -0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00  -0.02
***  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
CR5  0.09  0.01  -0.01  0.09  0.00  0.00  -0.02  0.00 
  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Crisis  -0.02  0.01
**  0.01  -0.01  -0.00  0.01
***  0.02  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Sregion          -0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.01 
          (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Slanguage          0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
          (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Slaw          0.01  -0.01  -0.01  0.01 
          (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Deconomy          0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
          (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
N  1533  1499  1523  1523  1533  1499  1523  1523 
R
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* correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
5.2.  Subsidiaries in developed and developing countries 
As the existing studies present mixed results due to the host country’s economic 
development, the sample is partitioned into developed and developing economies. 
Splitting the sample enables us to address the question of whether the profitability of 
subsidiaries related to parent banks is different in economically diverse countries. The 
regression is estimated using fixed and random models and the results do not differ 
significantly from each other. Therefore, only the results for the random model are 
presented for the sake of brevity.  
The results, in Table 4, confirm that different factors determine the performance of 
subsidiaries in developed and developing nations. In developing countries, the coefficient 
for loans is positive, whereas the coefficient for deposits is negative. As both coefficients 
are significant, the results show that in developing countries loan activity is important for 
profitability, whereas the reliance on acquired funds does not have a negative impact on 
the performance. Hence, the results document that, in emerging markets, subsidiaries’ 
profitability is determined by loan activity, whereas financing is done interbank or 
through the internal market. Conversely, in developed countries, only the deposit 
coefficient is positive and significant. Consequently, the results confirm that in developed 
countries, funding is an important determinant in explaining foreign subsidiaries’ 
performance, whereas loan activity may not be (DeYoung and Nolle, 1996). 
The results, for both groups of countries, confirm that the high capitalization of the 
subsidiaries has a negative effect on their overhead costs relative to the parent bank. 
Moreover, in developing countries, the higher capitalization of the subsidiary is again 
related to increased net interest margins, whereas, in developed countries, the relationship 
is statistically insignificant. Moreover, only in developing countries does a low level of 
liquidity lead to lower overhead costs for the subsidiary relative to its parent bank, while 
in developed it is not significant. Once again, those differences may indicate the different Methodology and empirical results
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impact of the source of funding on the performance of subsidiaries in both groups of 
countries.  
The results verify the previous results showing that subsidiaries perform well when 
the parent bank is underperforming in the home market. As in the main regressions, the 
coefficients dROA and dNIM are negative and highly significant in all specifications, 
while the coefficient dCosts remains insignificant. 
Finally, the results document that the location-specific factors are more important for 
foreign subsidiary performance in developing countries than it is in developed countries. 
In developing countries, with low levels of economic development and growth, the 
financial system is underdeveloped and financial crises positively affect the profitability 
of the subsidiaries. An explanation for these results is that foreign subsidiaries profit from 
underdevelopment, whereas they are less affected by economic turmoil in the host 
countries owing to the different structures of clients as compared to domestic banks. 
Moreover, it can be assumed that, as a result of economic uncertainty in the host 
countries, foreign subsidiaries may improve their bargain situation and hence their 
profitability as they are able to charge more from their customers for their services. 
Indeed, the coefficient GDP  and  Growth  are negative, while the Crisis  variable  is 
positive and highly significant. Conversely, in developed countries, financial crises 
negatively affect the profitability of the foreign subsidiaries. These results may be 
associated with higher competition in the banking sector and thus the weaker position of 
many foreign subsidiaries in those countries.  
Corporate taxes are also again negatively related to profitability, yet the coefficient is 
insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient of tax is positive and significant when the 
difference in the net interest margin is used as the dependent variable. Hence, the impact 
of taxes seems to be important in both groups of countries in explaining subsidiaries’ 
performance, yet its impact may differ, which would explain the results.  
The results reveal that the distance between the home and host country is only 
important for the profitability of foreign subsidiaries in developing countries. In all of the 
regressions for developing countries, the coefficient region coefficient Sregion is positive 
and statistically significant. This means that the geographical proximity of the subsidiary 
to its parent bank determines its profitability as well as its net interest margins. Methodology and empirical results
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Conversely, the coefficient Deconomy is negative and highly significant in all of the 
regressions. This means that subsidiaries are more profitable when they are in less 
developed countries than their parent banks are. These results are in line with the findings 
of Claessens and van Horen (2009), who also documented that the geographical 
proximity and economic distance determine foreign bank profitability in developing 
countries. In opposition to them, however, I do not find the language proximity to be 
important. However, I show that the legal similarities of countries have a negative impact 
on subsidiaries’ overhead costs relative to the parent banks in developing countries. 
 
Table 4 
Foreign subsidiaries performance in developed and developing countries 
Dependent 
variable 
Developed countries  Emerging economies 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
ROA  NIM  Cost  ROA  NIM  Cost 
Equitys  0.16  0.05  0.37
*  0.01  0.06
***  0.12
*** 
  (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.21)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Loanss  -0.02  0.00  -0.01  0.02
*  0.02
**  -0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Depositss  0.04*  -0.01  0.02  -0.01
*  -0.02
**  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Securitiess  -0.04  -0.01  0.00  0.01  -0.01  -0.03
* 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01) 
Assetss  0.00  -0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Equityp  -0.05  -0.01  0.08
***  0.02  -0.03  0.38
** 
  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.17) 
Loansp  0.02  0.00  -0.02  -0.00  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Depositsp  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.01  -0.04 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
Securitiesp  -0.04  -0.02  -0.04  0.01  -0.00  0.17
*** 
  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.06) 
Assetsp  0.00  0.00
***  0.01
*  0.00
*  0.00  -0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
dROAp  -0.65
***      -0.50
***     
  (0.12)      (0.16)     
dNIMp    -0.47
***      -0.39
***   
    (0.08)      (0.08)   
dCostsp      -0.01      -0.20 
      (0.12)      (0.15) Methodology and empirical results




Population  -0.01  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDP  0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.00  -0.00
*  0.02
*** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Growth  0.09  0.01  -0.04  0.00  -0.09
***  0.04 
  (0.16)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.09) 
Tax  -0.03  0.06
***  0.05  -0.04
*  -0.02  0.03 
  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
M3  -0.02  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01  -0.02
*  -0.04
** 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
CR5  -0.00  0.02  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.03 
  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Crisis  -0.01
*  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  0.02
***  0.05
*** 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Sregion  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  0.04
**  0.02
**  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Slanguage  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Slaw  0.02  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.00  0.01
** 
  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 




        (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N  724  709  724  809  790  799 
R
2  0.02  0.10  0.25  0.04  0.22  0.10 
Wald χ







Note: Variables are defined in Table 1. Variables xS and xP are for foreign bank subsidiaries or its parent 




* correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
5.3.  Foreign bank performance and origins of the parent bank  
A number of studies have shown that the origins of multinational banks may matter 
for the performance of their subsidiaries abroad. As an example, Berger et al. (2000) 
found that banks from the US were more efficient than domestic banks in three of five 
host nations, while this was not true for other multinational banks from developed 
countries. Sturm and Williams (2010) found that multinational banks from the United 
Kingdom outperform other foreign banks in Australia. Thus, those studies show that the 
origin of the parent banks may determine the performance of its subsidiaries abroad. As a 
result, the sample was divided accordingly. I followed Leveen and Praveen (1994), and 
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distinguished three regions: North America (America), Western Europe (Europe), and 
East Asia and the Pacific (Asia).  
The results presented in Table 5 confirm the assumptions and show that the origins of 
the parent bank may determine the performance of its subsidiaries abroad. Internal as 
well as parent bank factors were important for multinational banks from Asia, for 
instance. The results are presented in the first three columns, where the variables 
presenting the level of subsidiaries’ loans and deposits are statistically significant. 
Although, the coefficient for loans entered the regression positively, for deposits, it is 
negative. At the same time, the coefficients for the parent banks of those subsidiaries 
have the opposite signs and are statistically significant, as well. Thus, the results 
document the existence of internal capital markets inside Asian multinational banks. In 
contrast to the main results, however, the profitability of Asian parent banks in the home 
markets does not have an impact on their subsidiaries abroad. On the other hand, the 
coefficient dCost is negative and statistically significant. This means that the subsidiaries 
of Asian banks have lower overhead costs if the parent bank has lower costs than its peers 
in the home market.  
 By contrast, the results show that internal factors for bank are of lesser importance 
for subsidiaries owned by multinational banks from America and Europe. Among the 
internal factors, capitalization positively influences the profitability of the subsidiaries 
owned by European banks, whereas for subsidiaries of American banks, the coefficient is 
insignificant. Nevertheless, it has a negative impact on the overhead costs of subsidiaries 
owned by parent banks from both regions. 
The parent bank effects seem to be less important for banks from America and 
Europe than for the Asian multinational banks. The results reveal that the level of parent 
bank deposits is significant and negative for American banks, while it is positive for 
European and Asian banks. Moreover, the results reveal that subsidiaries perform well 
when they are owned by relatively small American multinational banks, whereas the 
coefficient for parent bank size from other regions is negative yet insignificant. Similarly, 
the results show that the coefficients dROA and dNIM are negative and significant only 
for the subsidiaries owned by the European parent banks. For the subsidiaries of America 
and Asia multinational banks, the coefficients are negative but insignificant. Hence, the Methodology and empirical results
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results documents that the internal bank as well as the parent bank effects differ among 
subsidiaries and are strongly determined by the origin of the parent bank. The observed 
difference explains why parent bank profit efficiency was found to be important for 
subsidiaries of Greek multinational banks, while the opposite was true for foreign 
subsidiaries operating in Australia. 
The results also present large differences in the impact of location-specific variables 
on foreign subsidiary performance depending on whether it is owned by Asian, American 
and European multinational banks. The economic development of the host countries is 
important for the performance of subsidiaries owned by Asian and American 
multinational banks. By contrast, the results show that the performance of European 
subsidiaries measured by net interest margins is positively influenced by low economic 
growth and financial crisis in the host countries, while the last variable also determines 
the performance of the Asian banks’ subsidiaries. At the same time, the results indicate 
that the subsidiaries of European multinational banks perform better in host countries 
with well-developed financial systems, whereas it is the opposite case for the subsidiaries 
owned by American banks. The level of development of the financial system has a 
negative effect on the cost efficiency of the subsidiaries of the American banks, whereas 
it is the opposite case for subsidiaries owned by Asian multinational banks. The 
performance of the banks’ subsidiaries abroad is also determined by the tax level in the 
host country but to a different extent. In the regressions for Asian banks’ subsidiaries, the 
tax coefficient is negative, which implies that they are more profitable in countries with 
low corporate taxes. The coefficient is negative for the subsidiaries of American and 
European banks, but it is insignificant.  
Lastly, the results also present that the distance factors between home and host 
countries have different effects on the profitability of the subsidiaries relative to the 
parent bank depending on its origin. Among the distance factors, only legal proximity 
was positive and significant for all of the subsidiaries regardless of the parent’s origin, 
whereas the dependent variable was the difference in net interest margins. However, 
when ROA was used to measure the performance of the subsidiaries, the coefficient Slaw 
was positive and significant only for the subsidiaries owned by Asian multinational 
banks. The Asian- and American-owned subsidiaries were also performing better when Methodology and empirical results
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Foreign subsidiaries performance dependent on the origins of the multinational banks  
Dependent 
variable 
East Asia and Pacific  North America  Western Europe 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
ROA  NIM  Cost  ROA  NIM  Cost  ROA  NIM  Cost 









***  -0.10  -0.00  -0.06  0.00  0.01  -0.01 




***  0.05  -0.02  -0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.01 
  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Securitiess  0.03  0.03
***  -0.01  -0.05  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Assetss  -0.00  -0.00  -0.01
***  0.01  0.00  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Equityp  -0.01  0.23  0.09  0.88  0.58  0.40  -0.03  -0.01  0.07 
  (0.21)  (0.16)  (0.11)  (0.74)  (0.70)  (1.13)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.06) 
Loansp  -0.00  -0.04  -0.14
***  -0.07  0.05  -0.02  -0.02  0.00  -0.04
* 





**  -0.15  -0.27  0.02
*  0.00  -0.03 
  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.33)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Securitiesp  -0.05  -0.13
*  -0.21
***  -0.42  -0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.09 
  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.69)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.07) 
Assetsp  -0.00  -0.00  0.01
***  -0.08
**  -0.01  -0.03  -0.00  0.00  -0.01 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
dROAp  -0.46      -2.10      -0.62
***     
  (0.36)      (1.99)      (0.11)     
dNIMp    -0.37      -1.11      -0.52
***   
    (0.31)      (0.73)      (0.07)   
dCostsp      -0.10
***      -0.91      0.07 
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they operated in regions that were different than the parent banks’ home countries, 
whereas, for the European banks’ subsidiaries, the coefficient Sregion was insignificant. 
By contrast, the language proximity between the host and home country only determined 
the performance of subsidiaries owned by European parent banks. The subsidiaries of 
European as well as Asian multinational banks performed better in host countries with 
lower levels of development than in the home country, whereas the coefficient Deconomy 
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***  -0.10  -0.00  -0.06  0.00  0.01  -0.01 
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***  -0.42  -0.01  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.09 
  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.69)  (0.11)  (0.26)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.07) 
Assetsp  -0.00  -0.00  0.01
***  -0.08
**  -0.01  -0.03  -0.00  0.00  -0.01 
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dROAp  -0.46      -2.10      -0.62
***     
  (0.36)      (1.99)      (0.11)     
dNIMp    -0.37      -1.11      -0.52
***   
    (0.31)      (0.73)      (0.07)   
dCostsp      -0.10
***      -0.91      0.07 Methodology and empirical results




5.4.  Winners and losers among foreign subsidiaries. 
Another approach for studying the performance of foreign bank subsidiaries is to 
estimate the probability of being the best and worst subsidiary relative to the parent bank. 
To do this, discrete variables for best and worst performance were constructed. A bank 
was qualified as best (worst) subsidiary performer when it was in the highest (lowest) 
quartile based on ROA, NIM or Cost. Then, a logit with fixed and random effects was 
employed, which allowed us to estimate the probability of subsidiaries’ performance 
abroad. In the regression, the dependent variable is one if a foreign subsidiary is the best 
(worst) performer and zero otherwise, while its probability is explained by the same set 
of covariates as in the main regression.  
Table  6 reports the parameter estimates for the probability of subsidiaries’ 
performance abroad, which are in general in line with the previous findings. Among the 
internal banks’ factors, the coefficients for capitalization, loans and assets enter the mode 
for best and worst performing foreign bank subsidiaries as significant but with opposite 
signs. The variables for capitalization and loans are positive when determinants for best 
performing subsidiaries are estimated. Yet, the variable loan is only significant when the 
difference in the net interest margin is used as the dependent variable. At the same time, 
the high capitalization of the subsidiaries has a negative impact on its overhead cost, 
while size has the opposite effect. In contrast, the regression for  worst performing 
subsidiaries reveals that a low volume of credit has a negative impact on its profitability, 
but the results also show that it reduces the overhead costs. 
The results confirm the main findings and document the fact that subsidiaries are 
performing better (worse) abroad when the parent bank is underperforming 
(overperforming) in the home market. In the best performing subsidiary regression, the 
loan coefficient for parent banks is negative and significant. By contrast, in the regression 
for the worst performing subsidiary, the capitalization for the parent bank, its loans as 
well as the deposit coefficient, are positive and significant. Hence, the results indicate 
that the parent banks allocate their assets to the best performing markets. 
Again, in line with the main results, the regression reveals that foreign subsidiaries 
are performing better when the parent bank is from a more developed market than the 
host country is. Moreover, the results show that subsidiaries perform better in large 
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      (0.02)      (0.98)      (0.16) 
Population  0.00  0.00  -0.01
***  -0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
GDP  0.01  0.01
*  0.01
*  0.03
**  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Growth  0.06  -0.13  -0.13
**  0.21  -0.06  -0.08  0.05  -0.08
**  0.03 
  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.05)  (0.23)  (0.05)  (0.19)  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
Tax  -0.13
**  -0.06
**  0.06  -0.17  0.06  -0.07  -0.03  -0.02  0.03 
  (0.06)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.12)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 





**  0.00  -0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
CR5  -0.03  0.00  -0.02  -0.00  0.05  0.05  0.01  -0.00  -0.04
* 
  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Crisis  0.01  0.01
**  0.00  -0.03  -0.00  -0.01  -0.00  0.01
**  0.03 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) 
Sregion  -0.05
*  -0.04
***  0.02  -0.14
*  -0.06
**  -0.07  -0.00  0.00  0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.08)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Slanguage  -0.00  0.00  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.01  0.00
*  0.00  0.00 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Slaw  0.05
***  0.02
**  -0.00  0.11
*  -0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01
**  0.01 
  (0.02)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Deconomy  -0.10
***  -0.11
***  -0.03  0.06  0.02  0.06  -0.01
*  -0.01  -0.02 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
N  103  103  103  295  295  295  1024  990  1014 
R












Note: Variables are defined in Table 1. Variables xS and xP are for foreign bank subsidiaries or its parent banks, respectively.  Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses and they are clustered by multinational banks. 
***, 
** and 
* correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively. 
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the high capitalization of the subsidiaries has a negative impact on its overhead cost, 
while size has the opposite effect. In contrast, the regression for  worst performing 
subsidiaries reveals that a low volume of credit has a negative impact on its profitability, 
but the results also show that it reduces the overhead costs. 
The results confirm the main findings and document the fact that subsidiaries are 
performing better (worse) abroad when the parent bank is underperforming 
(overperforming) in the home market. In the best performing subsidiary regression, the 
loan coefficient for parent banks is negative and significant. By contrast, in the regression 
for the worst performing subsidiary, the capitalization for the parent bank, its loans as 
well as the deposit coefficient, are positive and significant. Hence, the results indicate 
that the parent banks allocate their assets to the best performing markets. 
Again, in line with the main results, the regression reveals that foreign subsidiaries 
are performing better when the parent bank is from a more developed market than the 
host country is. Moreover, the results show that subsidiaries perform better in large 
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countries with highly developed financial systems. On the other hand, the results confirm 
that subsidiaries generate higher net interest margins in countries with less developed 
financial systems and in periods of financial crisis. Moreover, foreign subsidiaries 
perform better (worse) in countries with high concentrations, which has a positive 
(negative) impact on cost efficiency.  
Finally, the results verify that the host country’s corporate tax level has an important 
impact on the profitability of foreign subsidiaries. The best performing subsidiaries report 
high overhead costs in countries with high taxes. There is only weak evidence showing 
that the geographical, legal or cultural distance between the host and home market has a 
significant impact on the performance of the subsidiary abroad.  
 
Table 6 
Best and worst performing foreign subsidiaries relative to its parent bank 
Dependent 
variable 
Best performing subsidiaries  Worst performing subsidiaries 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 




***  1.50  -3.03
*  -8.90
*** 
  (1.09)  (1.27)  (1.85)  (1.27)  (1.60)  (2.35) 
Loanss  0.89  1.40




  (0.60)  (0.71)  (0.81)  (0.85)  (0.97)  (1.07) 
Depositss  0.03  -1.22
*  0.33  -0.45  -0.22  -1.68 
  (0.62)  (0.70)  (0.84)  (0.80)  (0.90)  (1.15) 
Securitiess  0.48  -0.29  -0.55  -0.92  0.20  2.95
** 
  (0.73)  (0.89)  (1.04)  (1.01)  (0.99)  (1.40) 
Assetss  -0.26
***  -0.14  -0.67
***  -0.20
*  -0.05  0.17 
  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.13)  (0.17) 
Equityp  -2.23  0.09  7.75
***  9.03
***  10.59
***  -6.56 
  (2.66)  (2.80)  (2.87)  (2.35)  (3.65)  (4.29) 
Loansp  -1.96
**  -0.04  -1.99  -0.91  2.95
*  7.29
*** 
  (0.99)  (1.13)  (1.54)  (1.19)  (1.51)  (2.42) 
Depositsp  1.75  0.31  1.61  3.09
*  -0.17  2.28 
  (1.16)  (1.25)  (1.61)  (1.70)  (1.76)  (2.17) 
Securitiesp  -1.71  0.48  2.03  -1.23  1.68  -1.35 
  (1.57)  (1.66)  (2.31)  (1.91)  (2.22)  (2.75) 
Assetsp  0.17  0.23  0.20  -0.34
*  -0.72
***  0.50 
  (0.15)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.31) 
dROAp  -51.34
***      46.13
***     
  (10.81)      (11.45)     
dNIMp    -46.53
***      51.72
***   
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    (9.60)      (11.79)   
dCostsp      6.89      -73.64
*** 
      (8.02)      (14.84) 
Population  0.27
**  0.13  0.16  -0.11  -0.08  -0.84
*** 
  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.30) 
GDP  -0.29  -0.19  0.43  -0.72
**  -0.21  -0.54 
  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.52) 
Growth  -2.51  -3.73  1.49  2.72  8.27
*  5.31 
  (3.27)  (3.26)  (3.86)  (3.90)  (4.54)  (6.68) 
Tax  -2.40  1.65  7.82
***  7.40
***  -3.52  -3.80 





**  0.09  0.74 
  (0.33)  (0.84)  (0.83)  (0.57)  (0.53)  (0.67) 
CR5  0.92  0.50  2.18
**  1.63  1.48  -4.83
*** 
  (0.76)  (0.91)  (1.11)  (1.09)  (1.18)  (1.57) 
Crisis  0.12  1.14
***  0.63  0.41  0.47  0.10 
  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.44)  (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.60) 
Sregion  0.38  -0.08  0.87  0.06  -2.14
***  0.74 
  (0.49)  (0.62)  (0.79)  (0.62)  (0.72)  (1.04) 
Slanguage  0.10  -0.18  0.48
*  0.06  0.50  -0.24 
  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.28)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.37) 
Slaw  -0.06  -0.04  0.69  -0.09  -0.08  -0.35 
  (0.34)  (0.43)  (0.56)  (0.46)  (0.56)  (0.80) 
Deconomy  -1.25
*  -1.69




  (0.70)  (0.86)  (1.11)  (0.93)  (1.11)  (1.62) 
N  1571  1507  1530  1571  1507  1530 
Log likelihood  -689  -578  -489  -358  -382  -358 
AIC  1426  1204  1026  765  811  765 









Note: Variables are defined in Table 1. Variables xS and xP are for foreign bank subsidiaries or its parent 
banks, respectively.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* correspond to 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
Lastly, I ensured that all of the findings are robust by subjecting them to additional 
tests using alternative econometric methods, changing the specifications and exogenous 
variables, or altering the sample data. The main results of this study remained unaffected 
throughout all of these robustness checks, but are not shown for brevity. 
6.  Conclusions 
When multinational banks expand abroad, they allocate recourses and capital to their 
subsidiaries in the host country. Consequently, it should be expected that those 
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***   Conclusions




    (9.60)      (11.79)   
dCostsp      6.89      -73.64
*** 
      (8.02)      (14.84) 
Population  0.27
**  0.13  0.16  -0.11  -0.08  -0.84
*** 
  (0.13)  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.30) 
GDP  -0.29  -0.19  0.43  -0.72
**  -0.21  -0.54 
  (0.23)  (0.26)  (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.37)  (0.52) 
Growth  -2.51  -3.73  1.49  2.72  8.27
*  5.31 
  (3.27)  (3.26)  (3.86)  (3.90)  (4.54)  (6.68) 
Tax  -2.40  1.65  7.82
***  7.40
***  -3.52  -3.80 





**  0.09  0.74 
  (0.33)  (0.84)  (0.83)  (0.57)  (0.53)  (0.67) 
CR5  0.92  0.50  2.18
**  1.63  1.48  -4.83
*** 
  (0.76)  (0.91)  (1.11)  (1.09)  (1.18)  (1.57) 
Crisis  0.12  1.14
***  0.63  0.41  0.47  0.10 
  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.44)  (0.51)  (0.51)  (0.60) 
Sregion  0.38  -0.08  0.87  0.06  -2.14
***  0.74 
  (0.49)  (0.62)  (0.79)  (0.62)  (0.72)  (1.04) 
Slanguage  0.10  -0.18  0.48
*  0.06  0.50  -0.24 
  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.28)  (0.32)  (0.32)  (0.37) 
Slaw  -0.06  -0.04  0.69  -0.09  -0.08  -0.35 
  (0.34)  (0.43)  (0.56)  (0.46)  (0.56)  (0.80) 
Deconomy  -1.25
*  -1.69




  (0.70)  (0.86)  (1.11)  (0.93)  (1.11)  (1.62) 
N  1571  1507  1530  1571  1507  1530 
Log likelihood  -689  -578  -489  -358  -382  -358 
AIC  1426  1204  1026  765  811  765 









Note: Variables are defined in Table 1. Variables xS and xP are for foreign bank subsidiaries or its parent 
banks, respectively.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
***, 
** and 
* correspond to 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level of significance respectively. 
 
Lastly, I ensured that all of the findings are robust by subjecting them to additional 
tests using alternative econometric methods, changing the specifications and exogenous 
variables, or altering the sample data. The main results of this study remained unaffected 
throughout all of these robustness checks, but are not shown for brevity. 
6.  Conclusions 
When multinational banks expand abroad, they allocate recourses and capital to their 
subsidiaries in the host country. Consequently, it should be expected that those 
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subsidiaries perform equally or even better than their parent banks do in the home 
market. However, in the literature, little is known on how foreign subsidiaries perform 
relative to their parent banks and what drives the outcome. Understanding this 
relationship seems to be especially relevant as this study documents that foreign 
subsidiaries are on average less profitable than their parent banks are, which puts in 
question the rationality of rapid expansion, which has been observed in many markets in 
the last few decades.  
On the other hand, the results also show that the difference in profitability can be 
attributed to the higher overhead costs of foreign subsidiaries in comparison to their 
parent banks. One of the explanations for the results can be that multinational banks use 
expenses in the first place to transfer income from host markets. The assumption is 
strengthened by the fact that in the regressions the tax variable is positive and statistically 
significant, which signals the use of tax arbitrage by multinational banks. It could mean 
that results are strongly influenced by transfer pricing. Buckley (2004) documented that 
multinational firms are avoiding taxes and transferring cash around the world by such 
devices as manipulating transfer prices, management fees, service charges, royalty 
payments and non-commercial interest payments. Henceforth, the profitability of the 
subsidiaries might be higher if it would not be distorted by the transfer pricing. 
However, another explanation could be that the subsidiaries’ overhead costs are 
higher abroad due to the existing distance to the parent bank and the lack of expertise in 
the host market. Yet, this explanation seems less likely as the regression shows that 
distance is only significant for profitability when emerging countries are used as the 
subsample. Moreover, as foreign subsidiaries are often newer entities than their parent 
banks are, we would rather expect that they have lower overhead costs as an effect of the 
better employment of the newest technology. Consequently, the transfer of income by the 
multinational banks using overhead costs seems to be the most apparent explanation for 
the results, yet more detailed studies are needed on this subject. 
The study also documents that foreign subsidiaries perform better than their parent 
banks when the latter is inefficient in terms of profitability in the home market. These 
finding suggest that foreign subsidiaries are especially profitable for less competitive 
multinational banks, which may increase their overall results through foreign entry. This Conclusions




could also mean that the home efficiency may not always be transferable, yet the results 
vary across multinational banks and seem to be relevant mainly for European, and to 
some extent, Asian multinational banks.  
While this study has tried to address the issue of whether foreign subsidiaries perform 
better than their parent banks, it does not address an equally interesting question: Why do 
multinational banking organizations continue to enter new markets when their 
subsidiaries underperform abroad? There are a number of possible explanations. First, 
multinational banks may transfer income from the host country, which points to the 
results of this study.  However, to establish these transfer and whether they can bias the 
results deeper knowledge on the existing relationship between the multinational bank and 
its foreign subsidiary is needed. Consequently, the existing results may be biased and 
foreign subsidiaries’ profitability can be much higher than previously expected. Second, 
multinational banks may follow their customers abroad to better service their needs and 
to retain them (Grosse and Goldberg, 1991). In this case, it is the overall profitability of 
the relationship with that customer that is relevant, not merely the marginal contribution 
to profits made by the foreign subsidiary’s bank. Third, multinational banking 
organizations may enter foreign markets to obtain benefits from international 
diversification (Buch at al., 2010).  
All of these possible arguments are likely, but more studies are needed to understand 
the ongoing existing relationship between the multinational bank and its foreign 
subsidiary fully in terms of profitability, which is left for further research. 
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